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RECENT DECISIONS
Procedure: Remanding Where There Has Been an Avoidance of a Federal Right
. Defendant made an extraordinary motion for a new trial to the Georgia
state court, which had convicted him of murder, alleging a deprivation of his
Constitutional rights because the system employed in the selection of jurors used
yellow slips of paper for prospective Negro jurors and white slips for Whites.
The court denied the motion, holding that he had waived his right to challenge
the array of the jury and also that he had not exercised due diligence in making
the motion. Held (6-3): Remanded to the state court for reconsideration due to
the State Attorney Generals acknowledgment before the Supreme Court that, if
it had not been for the procedural issue involved, as a matter of law defendant
would have been deprived of his constitutional rights. Williams v. Georgia, 349
U. S. 375 (1955).
On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed its prior decision on the
ground that, under Georgia law, a challenge to the array of the jury had to be
made before trial. Williams v. State, 211 Ga. 763, 88 S. E. 2d 376 (1955). A
subsequent petition for Certiori was denied by the Supreme Court. Williams v.
Ytate, - U. S. - , 76 Sup. Ct. 326, 100 L. Ed. 221 (1956).
The Supreme Court has developed, for its own governance in cases which
are admittedly within its jurisdiction, a number of rules under which it has
avoided passing upon a large part of the Constitutional questions pressed upon it
for decision. Among these rules of self-restraint is the rule that appeals from the
highest court of a state, challenging its decision on a question arising under the
Federal Constitution, will be dismissed where the judgment can be sustained on an
independent state ground. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S.
288 (1936). This limitation on the Court's granting review resulted from its
aversion to giving advisory opinions and its desire to keep within the limits of
judicial power in deciding cases and controversies, as the Constitution intended.
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911). Should a state court later affirm
its prior decision on a state statutory ground, the opinion of the Supreme Court
would be rendered nugatory.
The Court, however, has accepted jurisdiction in cases in which the state
ground is not independent, but is interwoven with the federal ground, Abie State
Bank v. Bryan, 281 U. S. 765 (1931); where the state ground is unsubstantial,
Lawrence v. State Tax Commissioner, 286 U. S. 276 (1932); untenable, Ward v.
Love County Board of Commissioners, 253 U. S. 17 (1920); or where the non-
federal ground was present but was not actually decided by the state court,
Grayson v. Harris, 267 U. S. 352 (1925).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
In the instant case, certiorari was granted because the Supreme Court felt
that the state procedural ground was not the only ground on which the decision
rested, and therefore, the result was untenable as an avoidance of a federal right.
Admitting that a state procedural rule which forbids the raising of federal questions
at late stages in a case is a valid exercise of state power, the Court held that where
a state court allows federal questions to be raised at a late stage in proceedings in
state courts and to be determined by such courts as a matter of discretion, the
Supreme Court is not precluded from deciding whether state court action in the
particular circumstances is, in effect, an avoidance of the federal right.
In the light of the decision in Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559 (1954),
outlawing the use of colored slips in jury, the Court decided that it should not
exercise its jurisdiction over the substantive issue but should remand. It was felt
that where an important factor had intervened the State court ought to be allowed
another chance to look at the case. Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600 (1935).
In this reexamination of its position, the State's attention was called to two factors:
(1) the State Attorney General's acknowledgment, in argument before the Court,
that the defendant had been denied his constitutional rights, and (2) his intima-
tion in the brief that another remedy was open to defendant, which was not
designated.
The dissenters objected to the use of evasive tactics by the majority which
resulted in a failure to set out adequate grounds for the granting of certiorari.
They felt that the Court should not have taken jurisdiction where there was an
adequate independent state ground, urging that the proper course would be to
recognize and honor reasonable state procedure as a valid exercise of sovereign
power. They further disagreed with the Court on the question of the propriety of
remanding for further consideration of the case by the State, feeling that the
Attorney General's statement should be disregarded in light of the Georgia State
Court's pronouncement that, but for the procedural objection, the Avery decision
would govern. They considered the second ground for remand even weaker than
the first, since, if Williams had another remedy, he had it as well without the
remand, and if he had no other state remedy nothing was gained by the Court's
disposition of the case.
An almost immediate response to the Supreme Court's "advice" was forth-
coming, with the Georgia court's statement that: "This court bows to the Supreme
Court on all federal questions of law but we will not supinely surrender the
sovereign power of this state." Thus this unfortunate opinion of the Supreme Court
became a' valueless piece of disregarded advice upon reaffirmation by the state
court; since defendant's position was not improved, the only result flowing from
the opinion was a lessening of the prestige of the Court.
June A Murray
